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NOTES

The Reintegration of Hong Kong into
the People's Republic of China: What
It Means to Hong Kong's Future
Prosperity
ABSTRACT

On June 30, 1997, the United Kingdom will cede
administrative control of Hong Kong to the People'sRepublic
of China. Hong Kong achieved greatprosperity under British
rule, but the affect of China'sinfluence on Hong Kong's future
economic success is an issue of much concern as the 1997
transfer of sovereignty nears. This Note analyzes the
transfer of sovereignty and what it will mean to Hong Kong's
economic future. The author outlines the history of Hong
Kong and discusses the British role in creatingthe prosperous
colony. The author then analyzes the Joint Declaration, the
document which governs the transfer of sovereignty, and the
Basic Law, which will serve as Hong Kong's constitution. The
author addresses the current climate in Hong Kong, focusing
on attitudes and developments in both Hong Kong and China,
to evaluate how the upcoming transfer has been received and
what effects it has created. The author concludes that the
Hong Kong of the future will continue to prosper and remain a
Pacific economic center. However, the brightest days of Hong
Kong have passed, and Hong Kong will not likely recapture
the financial success of the "glorydays" of the late 1980s.
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THE FUTURE OFHONG KONG

I. INTRODUCTION
At midnight on June 30, 1997, the United Kingdom, will cede
administrative control of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of
China. Since Great Britain gained control of Hong Kong in the
nineteenth century, Hong Kong has developed into a leading
world economic center. Indeed, Hong Kong's status as a free
port-with almost no import duties and few restrictions on which
states' merchants and goods can conduct business-has enabled
it to become one of the world's leading economic centers. Because
of Hong Kong's importance to the world economy, Hong Kong's
upcoming reintegration into the People's Republic of China raises
many issues for those who reside or conduct business in Hong
Kong. The most important issue is whether Hong Kong will enjoy
the same level of prosperity after the transfer of sovereignty as it
currently enjoys under British rule. The analysis of this issue,
however, raises several other questions. What will become of the
permanent residents of Hong Kong? How will China treat Hong
Kong? How will the rest of the world treat Hong Kong? What will

be the result of the interplay between the Chinese socialist system
and the capitalist system of Hong Kong? This Note will attempt to
address these issues.
Part II of this Note discusses the history behind the
settlement of Hong Kong and describes how it became part of the
British Empire. Part III discusses the Joint Declaration, the
document that outlines the policies regarding the transfer of Hong
Kong's sovereignty to China. After tracing the history of the Joint
Declaration, this Note outlines various perspectives of the persons
and states directly affected by the transfer of sovereignty.
Ultimately, Part III analyzes the Joint Declaration and its effect on
Hong Kong upon the transfer of control. Part IV addresses the
Basic Law, which will serve as Hong Kong's constitution after
China takes control of the territory. Finally, Part V discusses the
commercial and economic implications of the transfer of
sovereignty by examining the economic climate in Hong Kong
from the late 1970s to the present, with particular emphasis on

1.
Throughout history, England has been referred to as England, Great
Britain, and the United Kingdom. In 1706, Scotland united with England and
Wales, and the resulting alliance was named Great Britain. In 1922, the
southern counties of Ireland formed the Irish Free State, and the name of Great
Britain was changed to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. See, e.g., Stephanie J. Millet, Note, The Age of Criminal Responsibility in
an Era of Violence: Has Great Britain Set a New InternationalStandard?, 28 VAND.
J. TRANSNATL L. 295, 298 n.8 (1995) (citing RICHARD J. TERRILL, WORLD CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A SURVEY 1 (1992)).
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China's unique "one country, two systems" arrangement. This
Note concludes that although the future prosperity of Hong Kong
is bright, Hong Kong has already reached its peak as a leading
economic and financial center.
II. HIsToRiCAL BACKGROUND

A. Hong Kong in the 1800s
Hong Kong's development as a leading world commercial
center began in the 1800s when the British Empire expanded into
the Far East. 2 In its quest for Chinese silk and tea, the Empire
founded Hong Kong as a British colony in 1841.3 Since the
4
1800s, Hong Kong has grown from a sparsely populated island to
5
an affluent colony of almost six million people.

2.
See Johnson C. Ng, Note, Hong Kong After 1997: An Experimental
Government Practicing Capitalism Within a Socialist Sovereign, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 67, 69 (1989); Eric K. Shiu, Recent Development, Hong Kong:
Prospectsof Autonomy UnderChinese Rule After 1997, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 141, 143
(1990).

3.
See HONG KONG 1981, at 232 (Cynthia K. Rao ed., 1981). Under the
Convention of Chuanbi, Hong Kong Island was ceded to Great Britain on January
20, 1841. A naval landing party raised the British flag on the island on January
26, 1941, and Captain Charles Elliot of the Royal Navy proclaimed Hong Kong a
Crown colony. Id. Prior to the establishment of a permanent British settlement at
Hong Kong, foreign trade with China was based in Guangzhou (Canton). Within
Guangzhou, all foreign merchants were strictly regulated. They were not allowed:
to reside in Guangzhou year-round; to have contact with the local Chinese
residents; to learn to speak the Chinese dialects; or to carry firearms. European
women were not allowed to enter factories. Moreover, customs duties were levied
inconsistently, port dues on British ships were excessive, and the Chinese trading
monopoly set all prices on goods, thereby preventing the British from bargaining
freely. The Chinese also referred to the Europeans as "barbarians" and treated
them as such. As a result, the British wanted a better trading situation: the
British traders wanted to come and go as they pleased; they wanted duties and
taxes to be levied consistently; and they wanted to be treated as equals rather
than as a lower class of people. The establishment of a permanent British colony
would help to accomplish these goals and would allow Britain to exert more
control over foreign trade with China. See G.B. ENDACOTr, A HISrORY OF HONG
KONG 5-10 (1958) [hereinafter ENDACOTr, 1st ed.].
4.
In 1851, the population of Hong Kong was approximately 30,000.
HONG KONG 1981, supra note 3, at 234. Before the arrival of the British Empire,
Hong Kong was used as a port by pirates. See Shiu, supra note 2. For a fictional,
but highly accurate, description of the quality of life and atmosphere in Hong
Kong in the 1800s, see JAMES CIAVELL, TAI-PAN (1966).
5.
The population of Hong Kong in 1991 was approximately 5.7 million.
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1995, at 840 (Robert Famighetti ed.,

1995).

See Patricia H. Palumbo, Comment, Analysis of the Sino-British Joint

Declarationand the Basic Law of Hong Kong: What Do They Guaranteethe People
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Trade between the Chinese merchants and the British traders
was one-sided.

The British bought Chinese silks, nankeens (a

type of fabric), and teas; the Chinese bought nothing from the
British in return. 6 As a result, the British quickly amassed a

large trade deficit with China and, in an attempt to eliminate that

deficit, introduced opium to the Chinese market. 7 Recognizing
the deleterious consequences of using this drug, in 1839 the
Chinese government attempted to ban the import of opium.8 The
prohibition on opium and the subsequent crisis surrounding the
seizure of illegal opium shipments in the southern port city of
Guangzhou (Canton) infuriated the British, 9 who were desperately
trying to reduce their trade deficit with China. The tension
between the British and the Chinese culminated in the first
Opium War, l 0 which lasted from 1839 to 1842.11

of Hong Kong After 1997P, 6 CONN. J. INTr L. 667, 669 (1991). As anecdotal
evidence of Hong Kong's wealth, Palumbo notes that it has the largest
concentration of Rolls-Royces in the world. Additionally, Hong Kong has "100 fur
retailers and up to a dozen brands of French cognac." Id.
6.
See JEAN CHESNEAUX Er AL., CHINA FROM THE OPIUM WARS TO THE 1911
REVOLUTION 49-50 (Anne Destenay trans., 1977). The Chinese believed that they
had no need for products offered by the European traders. The Europeans
desired trade with China, and if they wished to do so, then they had to accept the
terms dictated by the Chinese. See ENDACOTr, 1st ed., supranote 3, at 6.
See G.B. ENDACOIT, A HISTORY OF HONG KONG 10 (2d ed. 1973)
7.
[hereinafter ENDACOTT, 2d ed.]. Opium, purchased by traders in India, was in
heavy demand on the Chinese market. The British did not want to continue
paying for goods with silver, and opium was the only product in which the
Chinese showed considerable interest. This demand for opium led to widespread
smuggling of opium by Western traders. This triangle of Chinese tea, Indian
opium, and British silver enabled the British to create a more favorable trade
balance. See CHESNEAUXETAL., supranote 6, at 53-54.
See ENDACOTr, 2d ed., supra note 7, at 11. Opium has a long history of
8.
medicinal use in China, but in the seventeenth century recreational opiumsmoking for pleasure became common. As a result, addiction to opium as a drug
became a serious problem for the Chinese. Id. at 10
9.
See id. at 12. All foreign merchants were ordered to surrender the
opium in their possession. Additionally, several factories in Guangzhou were
seized, and many Europeans were held hostage by Chinese government officials.
Id.
10.
For a more detailed description of the conflict, see id. at 14-34.
11.
See CHESNEAUX ET AL., supra note 6, at 62. One commentator defines
the underlying causes of the Opium War as follows:
(1) The British merchants were dissatisfied with the Chinese rules
governing trade and the arbitrary duties and charges on ships and goods.
(2) The British believed that force was the only way to get the Chinese to
change their regulatory policy.
(3) The British merchants wanted to abolish the monopolies held by
Chinese merchants and to open China to free trade with Western traders.
(4) The British government wanted to open negotiations with the
Chinese government, but the Chinese would not admit to being equals
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The Treaty of Nanjing 12 officially ended the Opium War
between Great Britain and China. Under the terms of this treaty,
the Island of Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain in

perpetuity, 13 and thus Britain gained control of the first territory
comprising modem-day Hong Kong. 14 Yet, fighting between the
two states continued in the years following the signing of the
Treaty of Nanjing. After eighteen more years of conflict,' 5 China
ceded additional territories to Great Britain.' 6 Under the 1860
Convention of Beijing, 17 Great Britain acquired two more
territories of modem Hong Kong as China ceded Kowloon
Peninsula and Stonecutters Island to Great Britain in
perpetuity. 18

with the British. "Thus, negotiations would not occur unless the British
used force.
(5) Europeans were treated as "barbarians" by the Chinese.
(6) The Chinese believed that they were self-sufficient. Therefore, they
did not need to trade with the Europeans, and if the Europeans did not
like the terms of trade, they could return to Europe.
(7) The growth of the opium trade-illegal in the eyes of the Chinese
government-created a potential for conflict. However, without the opium
trade, Great Britain's trade deficit with China would increase.
ENDACOTr, 1st ed., supranote 3, at 14.
The conflict began when Commissioner Lin Zexu was sent to Guangzhou to
deal with the growing opium problem. He forced all Westerners to hand over their
opium, which was then destroyed. The British traders retreated to uninhabited
Hong Kong Island to regroup. The conflict began-war was never officially

declared-in southern China and then moved north toward the mouth of the
Yangtze River. The Chinese forces were soundly defeated by the British, and a
peace treaty was signed in August 1842. See MILTON W. MEYER, CHINA 254 (2d ed.
1994).
12.
Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Gr. Brit., 30 Brit. For. St.
Pap. 389, 93 Consol. T.S. 465.
13.
Id. art. III, 30 Brit. For. St. Pap. at 390, 93 Consol. T.S. at 467.
Additionally, five ports-Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai, and Xiamen
(Amoy)-were opened to British traders. In these cities, the British were allowed
to station a government trade official. They were also permitted to reside in these
cities year-round. Moreover, the British merchants could trade with whomever
they wished; the Chinese merchants no longer held a monopoly on all trade. See
MEYER, supranote 11, at 254-55.
14.
The colony of Hong Kong consists of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon
Peninsula, the New Territories, and Stonecutters Island.
15.
See Nancy C. Jackson, The Legal Regime of Hong Kong After 1997: An
Examination of the Joint Declaration of the United Kingdom and the People's
Republic of China, 5 INT'LTAX& BUS. LAW. 377, 380 (1987).
16.
See Wendy D. Bowie, Note, The Effect of the Tiananmen Square
Massacre Upon Negotiations for the Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
AdministrativeRegion, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 245, 248 (1990).
17.
Convention of Friendship, Oct. 24, 1860, China-Gr. Brit., 50 Brit. For.
St. Pap. 10, 123 Consol. T.S. 71 [hereinafter Convention of Beijing].
18.
Id. art. VI, 50 Brit. For. St. Pap. at 12, 123 Consol. T.S. at 73. Kowloon
Peninsula, approximately one mile from Hong Kong Island, extends toward the
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Great Britain acquired the final component of modern-day

Hong Kong, the New Territories, in 1898.19

The Sino-Japanese

War left China in a severely weakened economic condition, and
Great Britain and other Western powers exploited this condition
by demanding additional concessions and rights within mainland
China. 20 The British, concerned with Western imperialism in the

Far East, sought to expand the territory of Hong Kong to defend it

from attack by a European power or the United States. 2 1 In the
Convention of 1898,22 Great Britain convinced China to lease the
New Territories to Great Britain for ninety-nine years. 2 3 Hong
Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, Stonecutters Island, and the
New Territories constitute present-day Hong Kong.
B. Developments in the Twentieth Century
The New Territories have become so integrated with the
remainder of the territories constituting Hong Kong that the
Chinese government has found it impractical to treat the entities
separately.2 4 In fact, the People's Republic of China refused to
enter into any negotiations regarding Hong Kong unless all of
present-day Hong Kong was treated as a single territory. 25 Thus,

island of Hong Kong into Victoria Harbour. Stonecutters Island is a small area of
land situated in the harbor between Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula.
19.
For a discussion of the three agreements, see generally PETER WESLEYSMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997 (1983). After explaining China's view that the
treaty is unequal, Wesley-Smith discusses both the history of the 1898 agreement
and its impact on the future of Hong Kong.
20.
See Hungdah Chiu, Introduction,20 CASEW. RES. J. INr'LL. 1, 1 (1988).
The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) arose over a dispute about the rights held by
China and Japan. The Japanese, using a more modem military force than the
Chinese, easily prevailed in this short conflict. The treaty ending the conflict
imposed harsh terms on China. China lost its rights in Korea, recognized Korea
as an independent state, paid an indemnity to Japan, and opened four port cities
to trade with the Japanese. See MEYER, supra note 11, at 263-64. The ease with
which Japan prevailed clearly demonstrated China's military weakness and
caused China to lose territory for the first time since the 1860 Treaty of Beijing.
Moreover, the indemnity paid to Japan depleted China's treasury. See WESLEY-

SMITh, supranote 19, at 22.
21.
See ENDACOTr, 1st ed., supra note 3, at 260-62. The acquisition of the
New Territories increased the territory of the Hong Kong colony by 355 square
miles. Id. at 262.
22.
Convention of Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9,
1898, China-Gr. Brit., 90 Brit. For. St. Pap. 17, 186 Consol. T.S. 310 [hereinafter
Convention of 1898].
23.
Id. para. 1.
24.
See Palumbo, supranote 5, at 670.
25.
See id. China has gone so far as threatening to discontinue the supply
of water and other resources to Hong Kong. Given that China is the sole supplier
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the expiration of the lease on the New Territories alone is the
functional equivalent of the expiration of a lease on all of Hong
26
Kong.
Chinese governments have consistently demonstrated a
strong desire to reunite all Chinese territory lost over the years
with the rest of mainland China. Both the Chinese people and
the Chinese governments through the years have always believed
that all Chinese persons should be united one in nation. 27 Thus,
various factions within China had long considered the three
agreements 28 through which Great Britain acquired modern-day
Hong Kong as "unequal treaties."2 9 Moreover, one of the primary
goals of China's Nationalist Revolution, which overthrew the
Manchu Dynasty and founded the Republic of China in 1912, was
to abrogate the treaties and to recover the territories lost by the
Manchu Dynasty to the British Empire in the 1800s. 3 0 The
Communist government of China, which succeeded the
Nationalists in 1949, has likewise maintained that Hong Kong is
properly Chinese territory, which should be reintegrated into the
Chinese mainland. 3 1
The People's Republic of China has

of water to Hong Kong and the chief supplier of resources, the United Kingdom
considers this threat credible. See id. at 670-71.
26.
See id. at 670.
27.
China's primary goal is to reunite mainland China with the island of
Taiwan. Some scholars opine that the "one country, two systems" approach to
Hong Kong may also be applied to the People's Republic and Taiwan. See, e.g.,
Agnes J. Bundy, The Reunification of China with Hong Kong and Its Implicationsfor
Taiwan: An Analysis of the "One Country, Two Systems" Model, 19 CAL. W. INrl,
L.J. 271 (1989).
28.
Treaty of Nanking, supra note 12; Convention of Beijing, supranote 17;
Convention of 1898, supranote 22.
29.
Chiu, supra note 20, at 1-2. See generally WESLEY-SMITH, supra note
19, for a discussion of the Chinese view that the treaties are unequal.
30.
See Chiu, supra note 20, at 2. Chinese nationalism came into
prominence at the beginning of the twentieth century and revolved around two
themes: hatred of the Manchu Dynasty and hostility toward imperialism. While
all the layers of Chinese society did not have the same vision for the future of
China, these twin themes provided lightning rods that united much of China for
the revolution. See CHESNAUX El' AL., supra note 6, at 362-63. The reintegration

of Hong Kong into mainland China is considered one of the top priorities for the

Chinese and "a mandate of the Nationalist Revolution." Palumbo, supra note 5, at
671. The Communists became more prominent in the late 1920s and began to
compete with the Nationalists for control of China. This competition for control
ultimately resulted in the overthrow of the Nationalists in 1949. See MEYER,
supra note 11, at 278-91. The Nationalist government fled to Taiwan after they
lost control of the mainland, and the Communists (led by Mao Zedong) took power
in 1949. See id. at 671 n.26.
31.
See Chiu, supra note 20, at 1-2. The Communist government views
Taiwan as Chinese territory that should be recovered by the People's Republic of
China. See, e.g., Bundy, supranote 27, at 274.
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remained very interested in reasserting its control over Hong Kong
32
when the opportunity presented itself.

III. THE JOINT DECLARATION
In 1984 the People's Republic of China and the United
Kingdom signed the Joint Declaration, 3 3 the document governing
the transfer of control of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to
China in 1997. The Joint Declaration also outlines the terms of
governance of Hong Kong by the People's Republic of China after
the transfer of control has occurred in 1997.
The major
provisions of the Joint Declaration may be summarized as follows:
1.
In 1997 Hong Kong will become a Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
under Article 31 of China's Constitution.3 4 Hong Kong will
enjoy a "high degree of autonomy," except in matters
pertaining to foreign affairs and defense.
2.
Hong Kong will be vested with executive,
legislative, and independent judicial power, including final
adjudication.
3.
Hong Kong's chief executive will be appointed by
the People's Republic of China after elections or
consultation in Hong Kong. The government of Hong Kong
will be composed of Hong Kong residents.
4.
Hong Kong shall maintain capitalistic economic
and trade systems for fifty years after 1997.
5.
The existing social and economic system will
remain unchanged.
Freedoms of speech, movement,
press, assembly, strike, and religion, among other
freedoms, will be protected by law. Similarly, private
property rights will be protected.

32.
See Bundy, supranote 27, at 274.
33.
Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, P.R.C.-U.K., 1984 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 26 (Cmd. 9543) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
34.
Article 31 provides: "The state may establish special administrative
regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative
regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in
the light of special conditions."

ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE GUO XIAN FA

[Constitution] art. 31 [hereinafter P.R.C. CONSr.]. Accordingly, Article 62(13) of
the Constitution provides the National People's Congress with the power "to

decide on the establishment of special administrative regions and the systems to
be instituted there." Id. art. 62(13).

512

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 28:503

6.
Apart from displaying the national flag and emblem
of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong may use a
regional flag and emblem of its own.

7.

Hong

international
agreements.

Kong

may

participate

in

relevant

organizations and international
trade
It may establish official and semi-official

economic and trade missions in foreign states, using the
name "Hong Kong, China" to maintain and develop
relations and to conclude and implement agreements with
states, regions, and relevant international organizations in
appropriate fields.
8.
The People's Republic of China defense force
stationed in Hong Kong shall not interfere with the
internal affairs of Hong Kong, and the expenditures for
these military forces shall be borne by China's Central
People's Government.
9.
China's National People's Congress will enact a
35
Basic Law to implement the Joint Declaration.
From the perspective of Hong Kong and the United Kingdom,

the Joint Declaration is an international agreement that gives the
People's Republic of China control over Hong Kong, yet limits the
extent of control that China may exert over Hong Kong after the
transfer of sovereignty.3 6
The Chinese, however, have not
indicated that they hold the same view regarding the Joint
Declaration. Thus, whether the Chinese will treat the Joint
Declaration as an international agreement-rather than as merely
a domestic agreement that can be unilaterally overridden by the
37
Chinese government-is still unknown.
A. The History of the Joint Declaration
Since 1983 the People's Republic of China has maintained
that it would not allow Hong Kong to become an independent
state.3 8 However, in response to a worldwide movement that

35.
36.
37.

Chiu, supranote 20, at 5-6.
See Bundy, supranote 27, at 273.
See text accompanying infra notes 68-72. The PRC does not recognize

agreements that it deems unequal or that infringe upon the sovereignty of one of
the contracting parties. The PRC, however, has been inconsistent in applying this
standard. This inconsistency has led several commentators to the conclusion
that whether the PRC complies with international agreements is determined by
political motivations rather than interpretations of public international law. See
Bundy, supranote 27, at 273-74.
38.
Cf. Jfirgen Domes, The Impact of the Hong Kong Problem and
Agreement on PRC Domestic Politics, in HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL
CONCERN 79, 87-89 (Jfirgen Domes & Yu-Ming Shaw eds., 1988).
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encouraged the granting of independence to colonial states,3 9 the

People's Republic of China was willing to maintain the status quo
of Hong Kong and thus entered into negotiations concerning the
Joint Declaration. 4 0 Despite China's assertions of its right to

control Hong Kong, the United Kingdom had always claimed its
right to rule the territory. In fact, until the late 1970s, the United
Kingdom had stood by its assertion that the agreements ceding
Hong Kong to it were perfectly valid. 4 1 In the late 1970s and early
1980s, as the expiration of the United Kingdom's ninety-nine-year
lease approached, both the controversy surrounding the Hong
Kong independence movement and the attempts by China to
Moreover, the
exercise control over Hong Kong increased.
infeasibility of having the United Kingdom continue its
administration of Hong Kong after 1997 became more and more
apparent. As a result, the United Kingdom began to negotiate
In 1982, in
with China over the future of Hong Kong. 42
of
the
lease
of the New
of
the
upcoming
expiration
anticipation
Territories, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher traveled to
4
China to broach the issue of negotiations regarding Hong Kong. 3
These meetings firmly established China's unwillingness to
consent to any agreement that would allow the United Kingdom to
continue to administrate any portion of Hong Kong. 4 4
Because the United Kingdom's continued governance over
Hong Kong remained doubtful, the United Kingdom had two goals
First, the United
in subsequent negotiations with China.
Kingdom sought to preserve the safety of the residents of Hong
Kong. Second, the United Kingdom sought to maintain investors'
The United Kingdom's safety
confidence in the territory.45
concerns stemmed primarily from the territory's dependence on

39.
See Palumbo, supra note 5, at 672. Specifically, in 1960 the United
Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

Peoples was issued. Hong Kong was not included in this declaration, but it did
encourage a movement for Hong Kong's independence. Additionally, in 1964, the
World Youth Forum Resolution mentioned Hong Kong among a list of areas to be
granted independence. Id.
40.
Chiu, supranote 20, at 3; see also Domes, supranote 38, at 88.
41.
See Bundy, supra note 27, at 273.
42.
See Ng, supranote 2, at 73.
43.
Thatcher negotiated with then-Premier Zhao Ziyang and thenChairman of the Military Affairs Commission, Deng Xiaoping. Zhao is no longer
Premier of China and Deng has resigned from his position; however, Deng is still
regarded as China's paramount leader. See Chiu, supranote 20, at 4.
44.
See Hungdah Chiu, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 7-9
(Hungdah Chiu et al. eds., 1987).
45.
See Ng, supranote 2, at 73.
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the mainland for valuable subsistence resources. 46 Moreover, the
United Kingdom feared that the fate of Hong Kong would be
determined unilaterally by the People's Republic of China if the
two countries failed to reach an agreement on the issue. 4 7 On the
other hand, the British feared that investors would divert funds
away from Hong Kong if its political, economic, and social future
were uncertain. However, if the United Kingdom could negotiate
an agreement that would provide hope for a smooth transfer of
sovereignty, then investors would continue to look to Hong Kong
for both short-term and long-term investment opportunities.
On September 26, 1984, the United Kingdom and the
People's Republic of China initialed the Joint Declaration, 48 which
the parties signed on December 19, 1984. The Joint Declaration
signified the United Kingdom's relinquishment of sovereign
control over Hong Kong in deference to administration of the
49
territory by the People's Republic of China.
B. Perspectives on the Transfer of Sovereignty
of Hong Kong to China

1. British and Hong Kong Perspectives Prior to the Signing of the
Joint Declaration
Since the 1800s, the British government has acted as a
"benevolent dictator" toward Hong Kong. The Hong Kong and

British governments made policy choices in the best interests of
Hong Kong, and the residents of the territory had limited input
into its administration. Consequently, the territory's residents
have shown little interest in the politics surrounding the
50
administration of Hong Kong.

46.
Hong Kong depends almost entirely on China for water, meat,
vegetables, and food grains. The United Kingdom recognized that China could
paralyze Hong Kong by shutting off its water supply. See Palumbo, supra note 5,
at 673.
47.
See id.
48.
See Joint Declaration, supranote 33.
49.
See Palumbo, supranote 5, at 674.
50.
Id. at 684.
Prior to 1982, the Urban Council was the only
governmental body in Hong Kong that was publicly elected; however, the right to
vote was held only by those who met certain educational, financial, or
occupational qualifications. Therefore, the residents of Hong Kong exercised little
control over the government around them and had virtually no way to change the
situation. As a result, only 34,381 residents of Hong Kong registered and only
6,195 actually voted in the 1981 elections. These voters represented only a
fraction of the potential electorate of 440,000.
See NORMAN MINERS, THE
GOVERNMENTAND POLMCS OF HONG KONG 118-25 (4th ed. 1986).
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a. Hong Kong Under British Rule-1842-1984
The Legislative Council (Council) has been the law-making
body of Hong Kong since 1842. Until 1985, the members of the
Council were appointed by the Governor of Hong Kong, and these
5
members swore an oath of allegiance to the Queen of England. '
In making the laws of Hong Kong, the Council considers two
The first category relates to minor
categories of bills.
52
The second category contemplates
administrative matters.
more substantive changes in the law, including: finance bills,
which authorize the budget for Hong Kong's government and
implement changes in taxation; substantial amendment to, or

complete recasting

of, old ordinances;

and

legislation

on

completely new subjects. 53 For a bill to become law, the Council
must pass it and the Governor must assent to it.4 The British
Parliament, however, retains the right to disallow any bill passed
5
Thus, until
by the Council and assented to by the Governor. 5

51.
52.

See MINERS, supranote 50, at 118.
See i. at 125. These laws include:

Clarifring ambiguities in drafting and rectifying minor omissions in
(a)
the law;
Simplifying procedures; redefining the powers and duties exercised
(b)
by particular officials;
Implementing international conventions and agreements (for
(c)
example, controlling the packing and labeling of dangerous goods carried
by air);
(d) Repealing obsolete ordinances;
Increasing the penalties for certain offenses; altering the liability to
(e)
include the payment of costs or compensation;
Changing the composition and powers of legally constituted bodies
(f)
(for example, making changes to the Housing Authority or the Productivity
Council);
(g) Bills to incorporate or regulate the affairs of private institutions.
Id.
Id. at 125-26.
53.
See id. at 129. Laws are passed in this manner in all but two
54.
situations. First, the Governor must obtain the Secretary of State's consent
before assenting to any bill relating to (a) divorce, (b) the grant of land or money to
the Governor, (c) currency and the issuance of bank notes, (d) banks and banking
practices, (e) the imposition of differential duties, (f) anything inconsistent with
treaties binding upon the United Kingdom, (g) the discipline and control of the
armed services, (h) anything prejudicing the rights, property, trade, or shipping of
British subjects not living in Hong Kong, (i) discriminatory legislation against nonEuropeans, and U) any provision previously disallowed or not assented to. Id. at
130. Second, the Secretary of State must also consent to a bill that contains a
clause requiring the Secretary's consent. Id.
Id. at 131.
55.
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1984, the British government maintained the right to exercise
nearly complete control over Hong Kong.
b. Hong Kong Under British Rule-1984-present
The approaching transfer of sovereignty from the United
Kingdom to the People's Republic of China in 1997 has
heightened political awareness throughout Hong Kong.5 6 The
residents of Hong Kong have begun to take a very active interest
in the transfer of sovereignty and the subsequent administration
of Hong Kong. For example, in 1985 twenty-four seats on the
Legislative Council were filled through public elections. This
election marked the first time that any members of the Legislative
Council were publicly elected-a significant step toward creating a
system of government that will be more accountable to the
57
citizens of Hong Kong.

Hong Kong's residents welcomed the impending transfer of
sovereignty when the United Kingdom and the People's Republic
56.
See Palumbo, supra note 5, at 684. Palumbo notes the British
Parliamentary system, with its checks and balances, has assured residents of
Hong Kong that the British government will not control the colony oppressively.
Id. China, however, has a centralized government with no checks or balances to
protect the interests of Hong Kong. Id. Therefore, the people of Hong Kong are
taking an interest in Hong Kong government while the opportunity still exists.
See id.
57.
See MINERS, supra note 50, at 119. Despite the trend toward political
involvement, occasionally there are signs that political apathy will return. One
businessman has even remarked:
I don't think the pattern [of government in Hong Kong] has really changed.
The British, despite the window-dressing, still go ahead and decide things.
People here are used, if not resigned, to that. [The British are] already
making their separate arrangements with China.
The people that are already on [the Legislative Council] who are not
government officials will be the ones who stand for election. It will be the
same old faces, so what's the point?
Chris Peterson, After All the Fuss, Hong Kong Grapples with Voter Apathy, Reuter
Library Report, Oct. 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
Another businesswoman has added: "I'm not registering [to vote] simply because
I can't see how it will help Hong Kong after 1997. I'm very pessimistic about life
here under Chinese rule, and I simply don't see the point. Call it apathy if you
like." Id. See also Hong Kong Reform Plans Lose Support, TORONTO STAR, June 27,
1994, at A13.
Other Hong Kong residents do not see the apathy in present-day Hong Kong,
but expect the apathy to return when the business people in Hong Kong begin to
make money under Chinese administration. "In the past 10 years the reality has
been that to make money you have had to be more interested in politics and in
what's going on around you. Perhaps in 10 or 20 years' time, when Hong Kong is
prosperous again, apathy will come back." Stephen Vines, Hong Kong Hopes,
Fears and Plans, GUARDIAN, May 5, 1992, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Non-US File.
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of China announced it in 1984. Unlike its prior governmental
actions regarding Hong Kong, the British government actively
consulted public opinion during the negotiations of the draft of
the Joint Declaration with China.5 8 Accordingly, the majority of
Hong Kong's residents supported the draft agreement.5 9 Those

who endorsed the agreement primarily did so because the Joint
Declaration seemed to provide a suitable framework for
maintaining Hong Kong's prosperous system. Furthermore, the
policies outlined in the draft appeared to offer a stable regional
environment and, perhaps most importantly, continued economic
stability.
Public support for the draft agreement, however, was not
unanimous. Dissenters expressed considerable concern over the
potential incompatibility of the "runaway" capitalist system of
Hong Kong and the socialist system of China. 60 Additionally, the
growing political unrest in China in the years before the signing of
the Joint Declaration and the potential effect that such unrest
61
could have on Hong Kong disturbed many Hong Kong residents.
Perhaps the greatest concern in Hong Kong is that the Chinese
government will not honor its promise to maintain Hong Kong's
62
capitalist system after the exchange of sovereignty.

58.
Palumbo, supra note 5, at 684; see also WHITE PAPER: A DRAFT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON
THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG (Sept. 26, 1984). Palumbo notes that this White Paper
was published and circulated among the people of Hong Kong in order to solicit
public opinion about the transfer of sovereignty. See Palumbo, supra note 5, at
684-85 n.126.
59.
See Background to the Negotiations Preceding the Sino-British Joint
Declaration, in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG, supra note 44, at 202 [hereinafter
Background to Negotiations]. The Governor of Hong Kong established an
Assessment Office "to provide the British Government with an analysis and
assessment of opinion in Hong Kong on the draft agreement." Id. at 201. The
office received views from the media, 430 representative organizations and
In his report, the
Id. at 202.
groups, and twenty-three opinion polls.
Commissioner of the Assessment Office concluded that most of the people of the

colony supported the draft agreement-a conclusion accepted as reliable by
independent observers. Id. Moreover, all the principal representative bodies in
Hong Kong-including the Executive Council, the Legislative Council, the Urban
Council, and all eighteen district boards-voiced their support. Id. at 202.
60.
Palumbo, supranote 5, at 685.
61.
Id. For a discussion of political unrest, the Tiananmen Square
massacre, and its impact on Hong Kong, see Bowie, supranote 16. Bowie, while
not reaching any conclusions about the condition of Hong Kong after 1997, voices
many concerns over the unrest in China. Id. at 264-66. Specifically, she notes
that the power struggle within the Chinese government renders the entire
situation very unpredictable. Id. at 264-66.
See Background to Negotiations, supranote 59, at 219.
62.

518

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[oL. 28:503

In 1984, upon the signing of the Joint Declaration, British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher conveyed the optimism held by
63
the British about the upcoming transfer of sovereignty.
Confidence in Hong Kong's government and, thus, its economic
future would begin to wane if Hong Kong were perceived as having
a bleak future. Indeed, the British had an incentive to secure
Hong Kong's future because many British citizens and
corporations had invested in Hong Kong. Many had lived in Hong
Kong for a number of years and considered it home, and the
British citizens who intended to remain in Hong Kong after the
transfer of sovereignty sought reassurances that their social
freedoms and property rights would still be protected. They relied
on the British government to protect their interests, which could
be accomplished through a smooth transfer of sovereignty that
allowed Hong Kong to maintain its unique role in the global
economy as a center of trade and finance. Therefore, the United
Kingdom wanted to negotiate an agreement with the People's
Republic of China that would maintain the stability and
64
prosperity of Hong Kong.
Upon entering the negotiations, the British shouldered a
heavy burden. For the sake of Hong Kong, they had to reach a
compromise with China that would preserve the rights and
freedoms of the people of Hong Kong. 65 Furthermore, the British
government recognized political strife and possibly violence would
erupt if it were unable to reach an agreement acceptable to both
the people of Hong Kong and the government of China. 66 Given
that the British were going to lose a valuable part of their empire,

63.
See id. at 203. In remarks to the Executive and Legislative Council in
Hong Kong after the signing of the Joint Declaration, Prime Minister Thatcher
stated that the Joint Declaration alone did not ensure a successful future for
Hong Kong. Id. Rather, the future of Hong Kong would be determined by the

"resilience, imagination and sheer hard work" of the people of Hong Kong. Id. at
203. The residents of Hong Kong had created one of the world's great market
economies. The efforts taken by Hong Kong's residents from the signing of the
Joint Declaration to the transfer of sovereignty in 1997 would be the decisive
factor in Hong Kong's future. Id. Ultimately, she stated that she expected the
prosperity of Hong Kong to "flourish and endure." Id.
64.
Id. at 199.
65.
See Palumbo, supranote 5, at 686.
66.
Id. at 686-87.
Cf. Ta-ling Lee, Hong Kong: The Human Rights
Dimension, inTHEFUruREOFHONGKONG, supranote44, at 115-33. A poll of Hong
Kong residents in April 1983 revealed that ninety-five percent favored no change
in the administrative control of Hong Kong. Id. at 123. Only forty-two percent
thought that Hong Kong's becoming a special administrative region of the PRC
was "acceptable, and a mere twenty-six percent favored an outright return of
administrative control of Hong Kong to the PRC." Id. While the opposition to
Chinese administration of Hong Kong was not unanimous among the Hong Kong
population, the overwhelming majority of residents favored maintaining the status
quo. Id.
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they could only hope to get the best arrangement for the people of
67
Hong Kong.
2. The Chinese Perspective on the Joint Declaration
The People's Republic of China approached Hong Kong as a
domestic, rather than international, concern. 68 This view of Hong
Kong has raised the issue of whether the Chinese will honor the
Joint Declaration after 1997 at all. 6 9 The Chinese government
has in the past shown a tendency of honoring domestic
agreements much less rigorously than international agreements;
this record, in turn, creates a greater cause for concern. 70 China
may deem the Joint Declaration valid only during the transitional
period from 1984, when the Joint Declaration was signed, until
June 30, 1997, when the parties execute the transfer of
sovereignty and the Basic Law takes effect as the law of Hong
Kong.7 1 The People's Republic of China will likely regard the
administration of Hong Kong as a purely domestic issue governed
only by domestic law because China will maintain that no

international agreement and, therefore, no international law

would govern the administration of Hong Kong after 1997.

If

China conducts the administration of Hong Kong solely on a

domestic level, then British warnings or pronouncements made

will have little if any effect on
after the transfer of sovereignty
72
China's decision maling.

Technically, the United Kingdom could have retained parts of Hong
67.
Kong---Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, and Stonecutters Island-but the
loss of the New Territories would have meant the loss of almost ninety-two
percent of Hong Kong's land. For the sake of political expediency, the United
Kingdom opted to cede all of present-day Hong Kong back to the PRC. See
Palumbo, supranote 5, at 687.
Id. China has always viewed Hong Kong as part of China and has
68.
looked forward to its reintegration into the mainland. Id.
See generallyHungdah Chiu, The 1984 Sino-BritishAgreement on Hong
69.
Kong and Its Implicationson China's Unfikation, 21 ISSUES & STUD. 13 (1985).
See id. This history, to a large part, could explain the Chinese
70.
negotiating strategy of refusing to enter into treaty negotiations with Britain
regarding Hong Kong. Instead of agreeing to a treaty, the two parties agreed to a
joint declaration. For a discussion of the distinctions between treaties and other
international agreements, see generally LOUIS HENKIN 9r AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW
416-543 (3d ed. 1993).
See Palumbo, supra note 5, at 688.
71.
For an opinion that the Joint Declaration is an international
72.
agreement, see Georg Ress, The Hong Kong Agreement and Its Impact on
InternationalLaw, in HONG KONG: A CHINESE AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, supra
note 38, 129, 135-37. The name given to the agreement does not affect its status
as an international document. The Joint Declaration is binding upon the PRC
after the transfer of sovereignty. See id.
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3. Recent Hong Kong Perspectives
Residents of Hong Kong initially welcomed the publication of
the draft Joint Declaration. Today, however, Hong Kong residents
view the impending transfer of sovereignty with pessimism. This
pessimism springs largely from the political turmoil in the
People's Republic of China following the Tiananmen Square
massacre in 1989. 7 3 The massacre instigated numerous political
changes within China. For instance, Zhao Ziyang, a co-signor of
the Joint Declaration, was removed from the office of Prime
Minister of China. 7 4 Hbng Kong residents fear similar incidents
like Tiananmen Square could occur within China after 1997 and
seriously affect Hong Kong if the world economic community
reacts harshly to China and decreased investment results.
Additionally, many residents of Hong Kong contend that the
actual transfer of power to the People's Republic is rife with
problems. Public opinion illustrates widespread dissatisfaction
with the British government's issuance of the November 21, 1984
White Paper, a formal British document that details how a
representative government for Hong Kong would be developed so
that Hong Kong could function autonomously. 75 While the White

Paper expressed the British government's favorable opinion of the
transfer of sovereignty, a close reading of the Joint Declaration
itself reveals a
startling
number of ambiguities and
uncertainties. 76 Because the White Paper offered a means of

73.
See Bowie, supra note 16, at 247. In May and June of 1989, many
students in Beijing protested against government oppression through non-violent
demonstrations and hunger strikes. On June 4, 1989, the People's Liberation
Army of the Government of the People's Republic of China killed thousands of
these protesters, most of whom were reported to be peaceful. Interview with
Nicholas Kristof, New York Times Beijing Correspondent, in Beijing, P.R.C. (May
14, 1992).
74.
See Palumbo, supra note 5, at 688. Zhao disappeared from public
view after his removal. He was reportedly removed because he had been too
sympathetic to the concerns of the protesters. Id.
75.
See George L. Hicks, Hong Kong on the Eve of Communist Rule, in THE
FUWRE OF HONG KONG, supra note 38, at 35-36. See generally WHITE PAPER: THE
FURIER DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG (Nov. 21,
1984).
76.
First, it is unusual for the PRC, a socialist state, to consent to an
agreement providing that socialist policies shall not be practiced in part of its
territory-Hong Kong. Ress, supra note 72, at 140-44. Second, the Joint
Declaration contains no clause addressing the interpretation of the Joint
Declaration. Id. Third, the "high degree of autonomy" that is to exist in Hong
Kong after 1997 may be restricted by the ability of Standing Committee of the
PRC's National People's Congress to interpret statutes. Id. Fourth, the role of the
PRC military in defending Hong Kong may ultimately expand into interference in
the internal affairs of Hong Kong. Id. Fifth, there is no guarantee that the
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including the residents of Hong Kong in the negotiations over the
transfer of sovereignty, the vagueness of both the White Paper
and the Joint Declaration has left many Hong Kong residents
without a voice in Hong Kong's future.7 7 In fact, the people of
Hong Kong recently have expressed strong misgivings about their
lack of participation in the actual negotiation of the Joint
Allowing the residents of Hong Kong to have
Declaration.7"
greater control over their future would likely lessen the fears and
uncertainties that have emerged in anticipation of the transfer of
sovereignty. 79
Prior to the Tiananmen Square massacre, conventional
wisdom in Hong Kong held that the Joint Declaration would have
neither a positive nor a negative economic effect on Hong Kong.8 0
However, after the political turmoil within China erupted, the
81
growth of Hong Kong's economic markets fell below average.
The escalation of political tensions in China has resulted in an
increase in emigration from Hong Kong. 82 However, recent events
have encouraged many Hong Kong residents that Hong Kong will
continue to prosper after -the transfer of sovereignty.8 3 In fact,
the easing of political tensions in China has coincided with
Today, the
favorable economic conditions in Hong Kong.84
majority of Hong Kong residents are optimistic about the transfer
of sovereignty in 1997 and view the Joint Declaration as providing

judiciary, like the executive and legislative branches, will be composed of local
inhabitants.
77.
See generally Palumbo, supranote 5, at 689.
78.
See Yuan-li Wu, In the Shadow of 1997: Interaction Between Hong
Kong and Its Economic Partners and Neighbors, in THE FUrURE OF HONG KONG,
supra note 44, at 116-20.
79.
See id. Martin Lee, leader of the democracy movement in Hong Kong,
has been very critical of the British and Chinese governments' refusal to allow
Hong Kong to participate in the negotiations.
80.
See Chiu, supra note 20, at 13.
81.
Hong Kong's economy expanded at a rate of only 2.5% in 1989, which
is less than one-third of its usual growth. Because the Tiananmen Square
massacre occurred in June, rather than in January (or some other month towards
the beginning of the year), it is possible that the growth rate could have been
much lower. See Palumbo, supranote 5, at 690.
82.
See id.

See id. For a Hong Kong citizen's opinion of the Joint Declaration, see
83.
Anthony Neoh, Hong Kong's Future: The View of a Hong Kong Lawyer, 22 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 309 (1992). Neoh does not reach any conclusions regarding the ultimate
effect of the exchange of sovereignty because he views the future of Hong Kong as
a wait-and-see process.
84.
For example, as the Chinese government has released more and more
of the prisoners taken in response to the massacre, the Hong Kong stock market
has steadily increased.

522

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:503

the necessary assurances that Hong Kong will continue to prosper
and grow economically. 8 s
C. Analysis of the JointDeclaration
The stated purpose of the Joint Declaration is the
86
"maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong."
More specifically, the Joint Declaration is premised on one
overriding principle: "[T]he socialist system and socialist policies
shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and . . . Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and
lifestyle shall remain unchanged for fifty years."8 7 In reaching the
Joint Declaration agreement, both the United Kingdom and the
People's Republic of China made significant compromises. The
United Kingdom ceded the entire territory of Hong Kong-Hong
Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, and Stonecutters Island-back
to China. 8 8 The United Kingdom also consented to China's
absolute sovereignty over Hong Kong, and neither sought nor
received assurances of a British presence in Hong Kong after the

transfer of sovereignty. 89 China, meanwhile, consented only to
allow Hong Kong to maintain its existing social and economic
system, 90 and agreed to outline its policies regarding Hong Kong
in a "clear, detailed manner."91 China's specific delineation of its
policies toward Hong Kong afforded Hong Kong and the United
Kingdom more certainty about the future by limiting China's
freedom to maneuver after the transfer of sovereignty in 1997.
1. China's Administrative Control Over Hong Kong
The most important and obvious aspect of the Joint
Declaration is that Great Britain will relinquish control of Hong
Kong to China. 92 Hong Kong will no longer be part of the British
Empire. Thus, despite the provisions of the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law that attempt to address concerns over maintaining
the economic status quo in Hong Kong, there are no guarantees

85.
See Palumbo, supranote 5, at 690.
86.
Joint Declaration, supranote 33.
87.
Bundy, supranote 27, at 274 (quoting the Joint Declaration).
88.
See id. at 274-75.
89.
See id. at 275.
90.
See Joint Declaration, supra note 33. Perhaps the most surprising
aspect of China's concessions to the British is not China's agreeing to allow a
capitalist economy to exist under Chinese authority, but rather its agreeing to
allow the inhabitants of Hong Kong to continue to enjoy freedoms such as
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
91.
See Bundy, supranote 27, at 275.
92.
Joint Declaration, supranote 33.
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that China will behave in the same predictable fashion toward
Hong Kong as did the United Kingdom. 93 The Joint Declaration
establishes Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region (SAR)
of China in accordance with the provisions of the Chinese
Constitution, a unique distinction for a territory under Chinese
While China will likely comply with the Joint
control. 9 4
Declaration, uncertainty ultimately exists about the meaning of
The Chinese
the term "Special Administrative Region."
Constitution explicitly provides that "It]he systems to be instituted
in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law
enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the
specific conditions."9 5 Therefore, Hong Kong's treatment as a
special administrative region will be determined by China's
By its terms this
domestic law, not the Joint Declaration.
provision offers no guarantees about Hong Kong's future

treatment under Chinese rule. Because the status of the Special
Administrative Region depends on domestic law, the Chinese
legislature could conceivably amend its prior legislation and alter
its policy towards such regions. In addition, China could amend
its constitution, potentially altering the treatment of Hong Kong
and any other Special Administrative Regions.
These scenarios, however, run contrary to the commonly held
belief that China will benefit from the continuing prosperity of
Hong Kong. 9 6 After all, China is Hong Kong's largest trading
partner, accounting for one-third of Hong Kong's exports. 97 The
two economies are so interrelated that the success of one depends
on the success of the other. Thus, many observers believe that

93.

Furthermore, if a dispute over the interpretation of the Joint

Declaration or the Basic Law arose, the British government probably will not have
any legal recourse. It is unlikely that the PRC would consent to the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice to decide disagreements concerning the Joint
Additionally, given that the Basic Law is seen as domestic
Declaration.
legislation, it would not be open to interpretation by the British.
As a Special
94.
Joint Declaration, supra note 33, para. 3(1).
Administrative Region, Hong Kong will enjoy a special legal status. Hong Kong
will have limited ability to conduct its own foreign affairs in fields such as:
"economic, trade, financial, and monetary areas and participation in international
organizations and conferences not limited to states." Ress, supranote 72, at 138.
95.
P.R.C. CONSr. art. 31.
96.
Telephone Interview with Roy F. Grow, Frank B. Kellogg Professor of
International Relations at Carleton College, Northfield, Minn. (Mar. 6, 1995)
[hereinafter Interview with Grow].
It is not felt, however, that Beijing and
Shanghai will benefit if Hong Kong thrives. Rather, success in Hong Kong implies
that important contracts will be directed towards Hong Kong and away from

Shanghai. Id.

97.

See It'sAlready 1997inHongKong, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 36.
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China will not alter its domestic law to circumvent the provisions
98
of the Joint Declaration.
2. Hong Kong's Degree of Autonomy
The Joint Declaration provides that while the People's
Republic of China will exercise direct authority over the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong will "enjoy a high
degree of autonomy." 99 Hong Kong's autonomy can be divided
into three aspects-political autonomy, economic autonomy, and
cultural autonomy-all of which affect the commercial future of
Hong Kong.100
Politically, according to the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong's
government "will be composed of local inhabitants"1 0 1 appointed
by the Chinese government. Thus, the Chinese government will

appoint the chief executive of Hong Kong,1 °2 and the chief
executive will nominate persons to serve as Hong Kong's principal
officials.' 0 3 Ultimately, the nominated persons must be appointed
to their positions by the Chinese government.1°4 Pursuant to the
Joint Declaration, the Hong Kong legislature will also consist of
Hong Kong residents who are elected locally.' 0 5 The legislature
will have the authority to enact laws governing Hong Kong,
provided that the laws are consistent with the Basic Law, the
06
constitution of Hong Kong. 1
The governmental structure of Hong Kong afforded by the
Joint Declaration appears to give Hong Kong a significant level of
political autonomy. However, the actual extent of Hong Kong's
autonomy will depend on two factors. First, interpretations of the

98.

Id.

99.

Joint Declaration, supra note 33, para. 3(2). However, Hong Kong will

not enjoy autonomy in foreign and defense matters, "which are the
responsibilities of the Central People's Government." Id.
100. See generally Shiu, supranote 2, at 158-61.
101. Joint Declaration, supranote 33, para. 3(4).
102. Id. The chief executive will be appointed from a list of candidates that
is the result of local Hong Kong elections or local consultations. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. annex I. Annex I is the elaboration of the PRC's basic policies
regarding Hong Kong. The Annex also includes details regarding Hong Kong's

domestic laws, its judiciary, and its economic system. In short, the Annex tries to
explain in depth the Chinese interpretation of the twelve subparagraphs to

paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration. Id.
106. See id. ch. II. The Joint Declaration provides that "It]he laws currently
in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged." Joint Declaration, supra
note 33, para. 3(3). Whether these laws will remain unchanged hinges on the
Basic Law, the document with which all of the laws passed by the legislature
must comply. See id. See infra part IV (for a discussion of the Basic Law).
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Basic Law must permit the passage of laws that allow Hong Kong
to institute its own policies in areas such as infrastructure,
taxation, and government assistance. For Hong Kong to enjoy a
high level of autonomy, the powers of the Hong Kong legislature
should be extended liberally so that the only restrictions are those
imposed by the Joint Declaration.
Thus, the Hong Kong
legislature should be permitted to pass laws in every area except
matters concerning foreign affairs and defense.
Second, the
persons appointed to government positions in Hong Kong must
accurately represent the wishes of Hong Kong's populace. If those
appointed to office in Hong Kong were mere puppets of the
Chinese government diligently representing the wishes of the
People's Republic and not those of Hong Kong's residents, only an
appearance of autonomy would exist in Hong Kong.' 0 7
The
ramifications of such a scenario are unknown, as the decisions
regarding Hong Kong would be made by the Chinese government
in Beijing, rather than by the Hong Kong residents who
transformed Hong Kong into a world financial and trading center.
However, it is likely that investor confidence in Hong Kong would
wane and economic growth would slow considerably. 108
Economically, the Joint Declaration provides for the
"maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong" by
retaining Hong Kong's current economic system.' 0 9 The Joint
Declaration elaborates that capitalist, not socialist, policies will be
practiced in Hong Kong 1 0 for a period of at least fifty years."'
Two provisions in the Joint Declaration offer Hong Kong's
businesses hope that the capitalist system will be retained. The

Joint Declaration provides that Hong Kong ultimately "shall
decide its economic and trade policies on its own" and "shall
retain the status of a free port and continue a free trade
policy." 1 12

The Joint Declaration also authorizes Hong Kong to

"maintain and develop economic and trade relations with all
states and regions."" l3
Accordingly, Hong Kong will receive
treatment as a separate customs territory and will be authorized

107. This is the fear of many Hong Kong residents today. Interview with
Grow, supranote 96.
108. Id. However, these are only concerns about what could happen. Until
1997 arrives and there is an opportunity to see the government of Hong Kong in
action, one can only speculate about the consequences of the transfer of
sovereignty.
109. See Joint Declaration, supranote 33, para. 3(5).
110. Id. annex I, ch. VI.
111. Id. para. 3(12).
112. Id. annex I, ch. VI. This free trade policy includes the free movement
of goods and capital. Id.
113. Id.
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to participate in international organizations and international
1 14
agreements.
Of critical importance to many managers within Hong Kong is
that Hong Kong will be treated separately from the People's
Republic in matters regarding taxation.1 1 5 Hong Kong will not be
required to declare its revenues to the Chinese government, 1 6
and the People's Republic has agreed not to levy taxes of any kind
on Hong Kong. 1 17 Thus, the Joint Declaration may insulate Hong
Kong somewhat from any internal financial strife in China.
Furthermore, by not investing China with the power to tax Hong
Kong, the Joint Declaration ensures that China will not be able to
exert direct control over Hong Kong's fiscal policy. 118 Hong Kong
thus appears to have some safeguard against any attempt by
China to slow economic growth in Hong Kong.11 9 Finally, the
maintenance of a floating exchange rate will help to insulate Hong
Kong from disturbances in the world economy. 120
Hong Kong is also poised to maintain its status as a leading
world financial center because its financial markets will remain
intact.121 The Joint Declaration provides that capital will be
allowed to flow freely and that Hong Kong will continue to
maintain its own currency. 12 2 Because the Joint Declaration
seems to provide for the ready availability of capital within Hong
Kong, the incentive to invest in Hong Kong will likely continue to
23
exist.1

114.

Id. As an example, the Annex names the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade (GATT). However, China has not yet become a signatory to the GATT.
It is unknown how Hong Kong and China would be treated if both ultimately
signed the agreement.

115.

Interview with Michel Collange, Manager of Merlin Gern, Tianjin Plant,

Tianjin, P.R.C. (Apr. 15, 1992) [hereinafter Interview with Collange].

116.
117.
118.

See Joint Declaration, supranote 33, annex I, ch. VII.
Id. para. 3(8).
However, if China controls the composition of the Hong Kong

legislature, it will indirectly formulate Hong Kong's fiscal policy.
119.
Interview with Grow, supra note 96.
120.
See RICHARD E. CAVES ET AL., WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENT, 404-07 (5th
ed. 1990). In an economy in which the trade balance is zero, a floating exchange
rate will allow the currency to appreciate or to depreciate automatically until
balanced trade is restored. The other side of this argument is that a floating
exchange rate does not allow an economy to export its internal disturbances,
because the currency will depreciate or appreciate until the trade balance returns

to zero. See id.
121. Markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities, and futures exist
currently in Hong Kong and will continue to exist after the transfer of sovereignty.
See Joint Declaration, supra note 33, annex I, ch. VII.
122. See id. Currently, the Hong Kong dollar is freely convertible in all
world markets. Id.
123. Interview with Grow, supra note 96. The growing investment in
mainland China could prompt even greater growth in Hong Kong. The possibility
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Commentators project that the Joint Declaration provision
requiring the Chinese to maintain Hong Kong's capitalist
economic and trade systems for fifty years after the transfer of
sovereignty will have two effects on the commercial life of Hong
Kong.124
First, the "fifty year" provision gives investors and
businesses some assurance that the possibility for profit in Hong
Kong will remain just as great after the transfer of sovereignty as
now exists. Second, the provision will encourage investment in
Hong Kong in the years following the transfer of control once it
becomes evident that the financial opportunities that existed
12 5
under British rule will continue to exist under Chinese rule.
Culturally, the Joint Declaration provides that the existing
social system in Hong Kong "will remain unchanged, and so will

the life-style." 12 6 Specifically, the Joint Declaration states that
specific rights and freedoms that are currently enjoyed in Hong
Kong will remain protected.' 2 7 In addition, China agreed not to
infringe on religious organizations and the various facilities

affiliated with those organizations. 12 1 These guarantees also work
to enhance the commercial prosperity of Hong Kong by protecting
Hong Kong against emigration and capital flight. Commentators
suggest that if Hong Kong no longer becomes a desirable city in
which to live, then many investors and entrepreneurs
will leave
2 9
and take their investment capital with them.1

of using Hong Kong as both a source of investment capital and a point of entry
into the Chinese resource and consumer markets leads some optimistic scholars
to the conclusion that the brightest days of Hong Kong lie ahead. What will
actually happen is not known of course, but Hong Kong's prosperity will depend
on the internal power struggles within mainland China If Shanghai is able to
exert greater influence over China in the coming years, it could prosper at the
expense of Hong Kong. Id.
124. Joint Declaration, supra note 33, para. 3(12).
125.
Interview with Grow, supra note 96. This potential effect concerns
both reinvestment from investors and investments that leave Hong Kong shortly
before the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, as well as initial investment from firsttime investors and those who had contemplated investment in Hong Kong but
were unsure of the likelihood of success of those investments in the wake of the
1997 change. Id.
126. Joint Declaration, supra note 33, para. 3(5).
127.
See id. The Joint Declaration provides that "[fr]ights and freedoms,
including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association,

of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of
academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region." Id.
128.
See id. annex I, ch. XIII. These affiliated facilities include schools,
hospitals, and welfare institutions. Id.
129. Much of the current emigration from Hong Kong is driven by the high
cost of living, especially residential expenses. However, some of the corporate
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IV. THE BASIC LAW

The true health of Hong Kong, however, will be determined
not by the Joint Declaration, but by the Basic Law of Hong
Kong.130 The Basic Law will attempt to implement the policies
outlined in the Joint Declaration and will serve as a constitution
for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 13 1 The Basic
Law was drafted by a Basic Law Drafting Committee appointed in
1985 by the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China. In 1990, the Basic
Law was adopted by the National People's Congress. While the
majority of the members of the Drafting Committee were from
China, twenty-three of its fifty-eight members and four of its eight
vice chairmen were from Hong Kong. Moreover, a Consultation
Committee representing the business, labor, and professional
communities of Hong Kong was created to offer nonbinding
suggestions to the Drafting Committee. 13 2 Thus, the Basic Law
was drafted with some input from Hong Kong, but the document
was ultimately approved by the Chinese government.
The Basic Law contains significant language which tries to
ensure that many of Hong Kong's current laws will remain in
force after the transfer of control to China.1 3 3 Specifically, the
Basic Law provides that "the common law, rules of equity,
ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall 1be
34
maintained" in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Moreover, according to the Basic Law, "national laws" of the
People's Republic of China generally will not apply in Hong
Kong. 135

flight is merely a change of corporate headquarters on paper only. Interview with
Grow, supranote 96.
130.
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1988, 29 I.L.M. 1520 (ratified March 1990;
adopted by the National People's Congress, April 1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
131.
Joint Declaration, supra note 33, para. 3(12).
132.
See Charlotte Ku, Introductory Note, People's Republic of China: The
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China [April 4, 1990], 29 I.L.M. 1511, 1511-12 (1990).
133.
See Colleen M. Granahan, Note, The Prospects of a Successful
Reunification of Hong Kong and China in Light of the Events at Tiananmen Square,
10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 83, 90 (1992).

134.

Basic Law, supra note 130, art. 8. However, any laws that contravene

the Basic Law will no longer be in effect. Id. Moreover, the legislature of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region has the authority to amend the laws
previously in effect in Hong Kong. Id.
135.
See id. art. 18. The only national laws that will be applied locally

within Hong Kong are the foliowing:
1.

Resolution on the Capital, Calendar, National Anthem and National

Flag of the People's Republic of China;
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However, while the Basic Law is generally regarded as Hong
Kong's constitution, it is very different from a constitution in
Most importantly, the Basic Law is not
many respects.
incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of
China. Thus, it is not part of the supreme law of China, and it
will therefore probably receive treatment under applicable
Chinese law as if it were a statute. 13 6 Aside from the possibility
that the Basic Law could be annulled by a subsequent act of the
National People's Congress, I3 7 a possibility that some scholars
view as unlikely,' 3 8 this discussion will focus more on what the
Basic Law states on its face.
A. Specific Provisionsof the Basic Law
The Basic Law provides that the "laws currently in force in
Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged." 13 9 It further states
that the law of Hong Kong shall be the Basic Law, the laws
previously in force in Hong Kong, 14 0 and the laws enacted by the

2.

Resolution on the National Day of the People's Republic of China;

3.
Order on the National Emblem of the People's Republic of China
Proclaimed by the Central People's Government;
Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on
4.
the Territorial Sea;
5.
Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China; and
Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning Diplomatic
6.
Privileges and Immunities.
Id. annex III.
Palumbo, supranote 5, at 699.
136.
Id. Although the Basic Law provides that there will be no material
137.
changes to the way of life in Hong Kong after 1997, there is much concern in
Hong Kong that the Basic Law will not mean what it says on its face. Id.
Alteration of the Basic Law is a possibility, but it is not a probability.
138.
Interview with Grow, supranote 96.
Basic Law, supranote 130, art. 3(3). There is some debate as to what
139.
"basically" means, but this discussion will take a literal meaning of the term and
assume that the laws of Hong Kong will be the same after 1997 as they are before
the transfer. This also touches on another concern. The Basic Law provides
today that the laws in effect in Hong Kong "tomorrow" (June 30, 1997) will be in
effect for years to come (after 1997). Id. This, however, is a complicated issue
and is properly left for a more in-depth treatment. The real question is what the
laws of Hong Kong will be in June 1997 and what they will be in 2047.
140. Those laws include: "the common law, rules of equity, ordinances,
subordinate legislation and customary law," except those laws in conflict with the
Basic Law. Id. art. 8. For a discussion of the commercial laws currently in effect
in Hong Kong, see generally COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS AND TRADE LAWS: HONG KONG
(Agnes Yung & Allan P.K. Keesee eds., 1983).
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14 1
legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Much of the language in the Basic Law is ambiguous, 142 however,
and future interpretations are quite uncertain. Nevertheless, a
number of scholars are still somewhat optimistic about the
transfer of sovereignty to China and expect the Hong Kong of the
1
future to resemble closely the Hong Kong of today. 43
In projecting the future economic health of Hong Kong, the
Basic Law contains several provisions designed to maintain the
existing capitalist system presently in effect in Hong Kong. For
example, Article 106 of the Basic Law effectuates the Joint
Declaration policy of reserving tax revenues collected by Hong
Kong solely for Hong Kong. 14 The Joint Declaration prohibits the
145
Chinese government from levying taxes upon Hong Kong.
Moreover, the Basic Law ensures that the government of Hong
14 6
Kong will implement its own monetary and fiscal policies.
Hong Kong's currency, the Hong Kong dollar, will continue to
circulate, will be issued according to the Hong Kong government,
and will be fully backed by a reserve fund. 147 Furthermore, the
Basic Law specifically provides that capital will continue to flow
freely in and out of Hong Kong and that the Hong Kong dollar will
148
remain fully convertible into other currencies.
The Basic Law also addresses Hong Kong's continuing status
as a free-trade zone, which was recognized by the Joint
Declaration over a decade ago. 14 9 The Basic Law provides that
Hong Kong will continue to operate as a free port,15 0 and that free
trade policies will continue to exist in the territory after 1997.151

141. Basic Law, supra note 130, art. 18. There is, however, room for the
Standing Committee to make additions to or deletions from a list of national laws.
Id.
142. One writer notes that the meanings of "laws previously in force in Hong
Kong" and "the judicial system previously practiced in Hong Kong" under the
Basic Law are questionable. The answer to this question of interpretation is not
likely to be known until after July 1, 1997. See Hong Kong's Future Legal System,
7 CHINAL. REP. 1 (1991).
143. Interview with Grow, supranote 96. However, Professor Grow believes
that Hong Kong's prosperity likely reached its peak in the late 1980s. Id.
144. Basic Law, supranote 130, art. 106.
145. Id. See also text accompanying, supra notes 115-18 (discussing tax
issues).
146. Basic Law, supra note 130, art. 110. Specifically, the Basic Law
provides that the government "shall, on its own, formulate monetary and financial
policies, safeguard the free operation of financial business and financial markets,
and regulate and supervise them in accordance with law." Id.
147. Id. art. 111.
148. Id. art. 112.
149. See Joint Declaration, supranote 33, art. 3(6).

150.

Basic Law, supra note 130, art. 114.

151.
Id. art. 115. For a discussion of these principles as outlined in the
Joint Declaration, see text accompanying supranotes 112-14.
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B. PotentialShortcomings of the Basic Law
The economic provisions of the Basic Law raise several
issues.' 5 2 The Basic Law, as it now stands, 5 3 requires Hong
Kong to have a balanced budget' s 4 and to continue its policy of
low taxation, under which low tax rates for individuals and
corporations will remain in place and import duties will continue
to be levied only upon a limited group of commodities. 155 These
requirements may hamper the Hong Kong government's ability to

swings in the economy or to conduct long-range
react to potential
6
5

planning.'
Some commentators have suggested that the Basic Law
57
represents pure propaganda and has no legal foundation.1
Skeptical commentators note that as long as the ultimate
interpretation of the Basic Law rests in China's hands, then Hong
Kong's future prosperity will remain in doubt.' 5 8 Almost all
commentators agree that Hong Kong's continued success will
depend not on the Basic Law, but rather on the international

152.
For a discussion of other concerns with the Basic Law, see Anna M.
Han, Hong Kong's Basic Law: The Path to 1997, Paved with Pitfalls, 16 HASHNGS
INr'L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 325-35 (1993). Han discusses concerns with veto
power under Article 17, national laws under Article 18, jurisdiction under Article
19, and treason and sedition under Article 23, in addition to concerns with the
economic provisions of the Basic Law. Id.
Because June 30, 1997, is two years away, there is still a possibility
153.
that the Basic Law will be amended.
Specifically, Hong Kong's
154.
Basic Law, supra note 130, art. 107.
expenditures must not exceed its revenue. However, the PRC includes the sale of
treasury bonds as revenue (in contrast to the United States), which effectively
allows the PRC to have a deficit. If the same is true in Hong Kong, the balanced
budget requirement will not mean to Hong Kong what it would to a nation such as
the United States. Interview with Penelope Prime, Carleton College Adjunct
Professor of Economics, Beijing, P.R.C. (May 20, 1992).
155. Basic Law, supra note 130, art. 108. Import tariffs are imposed on
only four commodities: alcoholic liquors, tobacco, certain hydrocarbon oils, and
methyl alcohol. There is no general import duty on goods brought into Hong
Kong.
156.
See Han, supranote 152, at 334. This opinion is based on the belief
that much of Hong Kong's success stems from its ability to adapt to a variety of
situations. Id.
See, e.g., id. In particular, Han notes that while Article 109 of the
157.
Basic Law provides that the government shall take measures for the maintenance
of Hong Kong as an "international financial center," a law cannot guarantee
prosperity.
Hong Kong's continued growth depends on world economics. Id.
However, Han neglects the spirit behind the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law,
which requires the Hong Kong government to take affirmative steps to promote
the financial markets of Hong Kong, which is well within the power of the
government.
158.
Id.
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perception of China and its administration of Hong Kong. If the
international investment community believes that China will
comply with the spirit of the Basic Law, then investment dollars
will continue to flow into Hong Kong.
However, if investors
believe that the People's Republic of China will rule Hong Kong
with a heavy hand, then capital flight and an emigration of
managers, technicians, and entrepreneurs-a "brain drain"--will
likely result. 159
Several factors indicate that the future of Hong Kong could be
bright. For example, many experts on China believe that the
Beijing government's inability to rule Guangdong Province, the
Chinese province that borders Hong Kong, with an iron fist bodes
well for Hong Kong.1 60 If Beijing cannot completely control its
mainland provinces, its ability to dictate policies that are carried
out many miles away in Hong Kong seems less likely. Thus,
global investors could perceive that the Chinese government in
Beijing is incapable of obstructing the implementation of the
policies outlined in the Basic Law. As a result, some scholars
predict that the Chinese government will actually respect the
provisions contained in the Basic Law after the transfer of control
in 1997.161

V. THE COMMERCIAL IMPACT OF THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY

A. Hong Kong's Response
When the People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom
first announced negotiations concerning Hong Kong in the late
162
1970s, the economy of Hong Kong experienced a down cycle.

159.

Id.

If the perception of Hong Kong is that China is overseeing Hong

Kong with an iron fist, then capital will be removed from Hong Kong, thereby
jeopardizing Hong Kong's future prosperity. Id.
160. Interview with Grow, supra note 96. However, Beijing does have the
ability to exert influence over Hong Kong by diverting valuable government
contracts away from Hong Kong and towards other provinces. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Y.L. Wu & Y.C. Jao, The Economic Consequences of 1997, 20 CASE
W. RES. J. INr'L L. 17, 22-24 (1988). While commentators who focus entirely on
Hong Kong would like to believe that the conflict between China and the United
Kingdom caused Hong Kong's economic woes, one must remember that Hong
Kong's economy is export-driven. Therefore, down cycles in the United States in

the late 1970s (particularly the high interest rates that discouraged investment)
and the so-called "Reagan recessions" of the early 1980s likely exerted similar
downward pressure on the Hong Kong economy. Not surprisingly, Hong Kong
began to recover at the same time as the United States was making a significant

recovery in 1984, coincidentally the time the Joint Declaration was announced.
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The real growth rate in Hong Kong fell from 17.1% of gross
domestic product (GDP) in 1976 to 2.9% of GDP in 1982.163 A
general feeling pervaded Hong Kong that post-Mao China would
permit the status quo in Hong Kong to continue because of Hong
Kong's economic importance to China. Thus, China's refusal to

allow the United Kingdom to continue to administer any part of
Hong Kong after 1997 surprised those who invested in Hong
Kong.164
Hong Kong's economy began to recover from this down cycle
in 1982.165 Many commentators attribute a key role in the
economic recovery to the increased investor confidence in the
wake of the Joint Declaration signed on December 19, 1984.
Moreover, the implementation of a "linked exchange rate" system
in October 1983 stanched the decline of the Hong Kong dollar. As
the economy recovered, the unemployment rate dropped (from
5.1% in March 1983 to 2.1% at the end of 1985), and the real
estate sector recovered from the uncertainty that existed at the
beginning of the 1980s. 166 These factors helped spur investor
confidence and allowed local entrepreneurs and investors to
economic
concentrate on productive and capital-intensive
currency
than
distractions
such
as
activities
rather
speculation.167 Without.such investor confidence, commentators
contend that Hong Kong's economy would likely have continued
to deteriorate. 168
Investor confidence arising out of the Joint Resolution's
The turmoil of the world
signing proved to be short-lived.
late
1970s
and
early
1980s threatened to
economy in the
destabilize the economic situation in Hong Kong.16 9 In fact, Hong
Kong's own banking crisis from late 1982 until 1986170
exacerbated Hong Kong's contemporary problems. The political
uncertainty in Hong Kong, as well as the Hong Kong government's
involvement in ending the banking crisis added to the turmoil in

163. See id. at 25 (citing data from Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics;
Hong Kong Government Economic Services Branch, 1987 Economic Prospects).
164. See id. at 21-22.
165. See id. at 22.
166. Id. at 24.
167. See id. at 22.
168. Cf. Interview with Grow, supra note 96.
169. Cf. Wu & Jao, supra note 162, at 21-26.
170.
See id. at 26. The banking crisis began in November 1982 when the
collapse of local property markets caused some fringe banks to overextend credit.
The Hong Kong government became involved in the situation in September 1983,
realizing that the failure of the banking sector might be perceived as an attempt
by the government to sabotage the Joint Declaration and to undermine the
economic health of Hong Kong. See id. at 26-27.
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Hong Kong's economy. Because the government discarded its
traditional laissez faire policy, investors were uncertain about
how the Hong Kong government would treat the private sector in
the future. 17 1 Anxiety and uncertainty about the future in the
early 1980s also lowered investor confidence, resulting in a
portfolio shift away from Hong Kong investments and towards
currencies and investments outside Hong Kong. 172 Furthermore,
the political uncertainty generated by the strife between China
and the United Kingdom resulted in stagnant capital formation in
17
Hong Kong in the early 1980s. 3
The uncertainty regarding Hong Kong's political and
economic stability caused many finms located in Hong Kong to
reevaluate their future in Hong Kong. 17 4 These firms undertook a
strategy of "precautionary relocation or diversification." 17 5 This
strategy involved four essential elements: (1) the removal of the

registered head office from Hong Kong to a foreign state,
preferably, a tax haven; (2) the establishment of branches or
offices in foreign states, or the acquisition of foreign firms in
whole or in part; (3) the sale of the firm's equity to a foreign firm,
or the formation of a joint venture with a foreign firm in Hong
Kong; and (4) the transfer of liquid assets abroad, leaving only
sufficient funds for transaction purposes in Hong Kong. 17 6 In
addition to capital flight and relocation by firms, a "brain drain"
has also adversely affected Hong Kong, as entrepreneurs,
managers, professionals, and technicians have left Hong Kong for
17 7
many of the Western industrial powers.
After much of the initial uncertainty surrounding the signing
of the Joint Declaration in 1982 had subsided, Hong Kong's
economy began to return to its previous level of growth and
prosperity. Typically, investors look for certainty over the life of

171. See id. at 26-27.
172. See id. at 27. In 1980, only 13.8% of investment was in foreign
currencies. Id. at 28. That increased, however, to 47.5% in 1983 and to 56.4%
in 1986. This shift could have been even greater if the Hong Kong government
had not implemented the linked exchange rate system to insulate the Hong Kong
dollar from worldwide monetary shocks. Id. at 28-29.
173. See id. at 29-31. Gross capital formation (in constant 1980 dollars) fell
three percent from 1982 to 1986. Id. at 29.
174. See id. at 31-33.
175. Id. at 32.
176. Id. The authors note examples of huge conglomerates relocating to
other countries and Hong Kong banks diversifying globally. See id.
177. Id. at 33. One writer maintains that a fifty percent increase in visa
applications in both 1986 and 1987 illustrates that the Hong Kong government
has been unable to restore investor confidence. See Shiu, supra note 2, at 16869. See also Michael C. Davis, To Go or Not to Go, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 18,
1991, at 20. Davis concludes that most people will remain in Hong Kong, hoping

that it will continue to prosper under Chinese rule.
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the investment before investing. They seek market stability so
that unexpected factors do not cause the economy to take an
Therefore, as uncertainty dissipated
unforeseen plunge. 1 78
through the 1980s, the investing public became more certain of
increased, and the
future prosperity in Hong Kong, investment
179
economy returned to rapid growth rates.
B. The Current Climate in Hong Kong
The Chinese and the British governments have both
expressed optimism about the economic health of Hong Kong after
1997. The British Foreign Office Minister stated his opinion that
Hong Kong would enjoy prosperity after 1997, and that the
British government will take an active interest in Hong Kong until
the actual transfer of sovereignty.' 8 0 Similarly, the Director of
China's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Offices'' has stated that
China "must let all foreign investors rest assured that Hong Kong
will remain an international financial and trade center." 18 2 The
intent
Director provided further assurances by declaring China's
183
to abide by the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
China's actions indicate its interest in ensuring the future
prosperity of Hong Kong. For example, businessmen from Beijing
have begun to accept and occupy seats on the boards of directors
of Hong Kong companies; the state-owned Bank of China is
preparing to issue Hong Kong bank notes; and Chinese investors
have purchased enterprises such as cinemas, bookstores,
publishing houses, and newspapers in Hong Kong.184
Additionally, Chinese-owned companies have invested in Hong

178. Interview with Grow, supranote 96.
179. These growth rates resulted from investment made mostly in the latter
half of the 1980s. These investments were perceived as certain because the life of
the investments would expire before the transfer of sovereignty will occur. Id.
180. See British Minister Vows to Stand Up for Hong Kong, REUTER LIBRARY
REPORT, Mar. 2, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File. Specifically,

Lord Caithness stated that the British government intended to defend Hong
Kong's interests when necessary. Furthermore, he indicated that the United
Kingdom would not make concessions to China simply to facilitate the transfer of
sovereignty. See id.
181. For a discussion of the resolution of the conflict between Portugal and
China over the administration of Macao, see Jaw-ling J. Chang, Settlement of the
Macao Issue: Distinctive Features of Beijing's Negotiating Behavior, 20 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'LL. 253 (1988).
182. PRC Official Assures Hong Kong of FutureProsperity,BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 11, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File.
183. See id.
184. See Peter Goodspeed, Dragon's Shadow Falls Across Hong Kong,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 27, 1991, at H3.
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Kong's hotel, shipping, construction, and transportation
industries.18 5
Such widespread Chinese-backed investment
implies that China realizes that Hong Kong's prosperity after 1997
depends, at least in part, on the Chinese government's
encouragement of the success of the territory.1 8 6 By investing in
Hong Kong, China sends out a dual message. First, China
expects Hong Kong to continue to prosper. 187 Second, China
publicly supports Hong Kong.
At the same time, the popular perception in Hong Kong links
its future prosperity with China's economy rather than with
China's government. Recently, the Hong Kong stock market has
begun to list a number of firms based in mainland China. 188 One
of the leading investment bankers in Hong Kong has stated that
"[t]here is no more exciting economy in the world than China's. It
is the emerging industrial power in Asia, and Hong Kong has the
189
market to play it; it is like Tokyo [thirty] years ago."
Sentiments such as these represent the interdependence that
exists between the economies of Hong Kong and the People's
Republic of China. Moreover, the Chinese economy is currently
the fastest growing economy in the world. 190 As a result, the
potential exists that the Hong Kong of the year 2020 will be even
stronger than the Hong Kong of today.
Strong investor confidence in Hong Kong has also been
demonstrated by an influx of investment capital, which began in
the late 1980s.
In 1987, for example, six new insurance
companies submitted applications to the Hong Kong government

185. Id. Chinese companies have sizable interests in one of Hong Kong's
major bus companies. Id. The Bank of China is Hong Kong's second largest
financial institution. Businesses in mainland China handle almost fifteen percent
of Hong Kong's exports and control ten percent of the manufacturing base. Id.
186. Interview with Grow, supranote 96.
187. Otherwise, the Chinese government (as represented by the Bank of
China) would not invest its precious funds in a losing venture. Interview with
Grow, supranote 96.
188.
See Simon Holberton, Mainland Moves the Market: Shares in Chinese
Companies Are Hot Property in Hong Kong, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at 14. The

Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong exchange are large manufacturing
and industrial companies. The Hong Kong market traditionally has been
dominated by property companies, financial institutions, trading houses, and
utilities. Id. The listing of the Chinese companies is significant not only because
the firms are Chinese, but also because they are representative of the Chinese
economy, an economy dominated by industrial and manufacturing businesses as
a result of the availability of raw materials and cheap labor.
189. Id.
190.

Roy F. Grow, Resolving Commercial Disputes in China: Foreign Firms

and the Role of ContractLaw, NW. J. INTL L. &BUS. 161,165 (1993).
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to establish offices and conduct business. 19 1
International
Business Machines (IBM) made Hong Kong its headquarters for
its business activities conducted in the Pacific Basin outside
Japan. 19 2
Moreover, many Japanese firms have established
manufacturing plants in Hong Kong. 193 Thus, there are many
indicators of strong investor confidence in the economic
prosperity of Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty in 1997.
C. The CommercialImplications of "One Country, Two Systems"
Perhaps the most unpredictable feature of the transfer of
sovereignty is the "one country, two systems" situation that will
exist when China assumes control of Hong Kong falls under
Chinese in 1997.194 "One country, two systems" refers to the
operation of the capitalist system of Hong Kong within the
socialist system of the People's Republic of China.
One
commentator had concluded that a "one country, two systems"
scheme could succeed only if the two systems remain
economically segregated. 19 5 However, because China and Hong
Kong interact on such a large scale and, thus, could not operate
independently, the commentator concludes that the arrangement
96
is bound to fail.1
Other commentators have chosen to focus not on the
feasibility of the "one country, two systems" scheme, but rather
on the policies and goals surrounding the scheme.
Many
commentators contend that the primary goal of the government of
the People's Republic of China is to reunite China's mainland with
Taiwan. 19 7 The reunification of China and Hong Kong, therefore,
takes on even greater significance because it portends China's

191.
Ng, supra note 2, at 84. In fact, the number of overseas investment
advisors has increased so significantly that the Hong Kong government
established a committee to monitor their activities. Id.
192.
Id. at 84-85.
IBM's Hong Kong headquarters will oversee the
company's activities in China, Korea, Taiwan, all of southeast Asia, Australia and
New Zealand. Id.
193.
Id. at 84. If the Japanese investments are representative of past
Japanese business strategies, many Japanese companies are expecting their

plants to be profitable for many years in the future.

This expectation would

indicate Japanese confidence in Hong Kong's prosperity after 1997. Interview
with Grow, supra note 96.
194.
For a more detailed discussion of the many differences between the
Chinese system and the Hong Kong system, see Han, supranote 152, at 335-42.
195.
See id. at 338.
196.
See id. at 338-42. Because China is Hong Kong's largest foreign
investor and one of its largest trading partners, the affairs of the two states are so
interrelated that the rules accompanying each system will blur. See id. at 340-41.
197.
Interview with Grow, supra note 96.
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prospects of reunification with Taiwan.198 If China has any
chance of opening reunification negotiations with Taiwan, it must
be able to point to the success of the Hong Kong "experiment" as
evidence that Taiwan can prosper within the People's Republic.
For this reason, China would go to great lengths to promote Hong
Kong's capitalist system after 1997. China's desire to reunify
Taiwan with the mainland lends credence to the belief that China
will abide by the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and take all
necessary actions to ensure that Hong Kong prospers after the
transfer of sovereignty.
D. China's Special Economic Zones and
Their Importance to Hong Kong

1.

The Advantages to Foreign Investors

In an effort to "open the door" to foreign investment in China,
the Chinese government undertook numerous reforms, including
the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).199 SEZs were first

established in 1980 in southern China.2 °° Investors are attracted

198. For a discussion of the "one country, two systems" scheme and
Taiwan, see Ng, supranote 2, at 89-92.
199. See HARRY HARDING, CHINA'S SECOND REVOLUION 131 (1987). The
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are more than zones with special rates of taxation.
They are designed to provide foreign investment with a common point of entry
into the Chinese economy, so that technologies from a diverse array of industries
can be studied and absorbed more easily. They have even been described as
"laboratories," in which various aspects of foreign investment can be tested before
introduction into the remainder of the Chinese economy. Thus, undesired
technology can be filtered out, while compatible technology can be siphoned in.
Id. at 164.
200. A number of considerations motivated China's planners in choosing
the locations for the SEZs. The most important of these are geographical factors:
(1) The zones are situated along the coast to facilitate the importation of
raw materials and the exportation of finished products to the international
market;
(2) Guangdong and Fujian provinces are the ancestral homes for most
overseas Chinese and, therefore, hold a special attraction for these
investors. For many wealthy overseas Chinese, the opportunity to assist
in the development of the motherland and simultaneously to obtain a
return on their investments holds both a sentimental and a practical
appeal;
(3) The SEZs' proximity to Hong Kong provides investors with easy
access to the zones, and permits the SEZs to tap into the infra-structural
resources of one of the world's leading financial centers;
(4) Locating three SEZs in the Guangdong province may also have been
influenced by political considerations. By developing the Shenzhen SEZ
on the opposite side of the border to the New Territories of Hong Kong,
China may accelerate the rate of economic development on the Chinese
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to the Special Economic Zones for a number of reasons.

First,

investment in an SEZ receives favorable tax treatment. 20 ' China
guarantees that all "assets, profits, and other legitimate rights
and interests will be legally protected," thereby ensuring that
investors are given "favorable investment opportunities in stable
business environments." 2 02 In addition to lower taxation rates on
profits, 20 3 finms located in SEZs are subject to zero or low import
duties. 2 °€ To encourage reinvestment, firms who reinvest their
profits in any SEZ20 5 may receive exemptions from
income taxes
reinvestments. 20 6

on profits resulting from those
Second, profits earned within the SEZs may be taken out of

China without penalty. 20 7 Under this feature of an SEZ, investors
were able to avoid the sting of China's multiple currency system,
which consisted of one type of currency that was not convertible
into foreign exchange and a second type that was convertible, but
had limited circulation and availability. 20°
Recently, however,
China has opted for one currency, which it has tried to make
readily convertible.
Although it is not always easy to convert
Chinese currency for other currencies within China, exchanging
Chinese currency for the more desirable Western currencies in
20 9
markets such as Hong Kong and Singapore is relatively easy.
Finally, firms located in SEZs also receive considerable
advantages with regard to obtaining a labor force. To enable a
firm locating in an SEZ to hire a labor force, SEZ labor service
companies recommend laborers to firms locating in SEZs.2 10 If a
service company's recommendations are not desirable to the

side and promote
Guangdong.

economic

integration

between

Hong Kong

and

Shiu, supra note 2, at 174 n.261.
201.
While joint ventures and private enterprises located outside of SEZs

are taxed at a rate of thirty percent, they are taxed at no more than fifteen percent
inside SEZs, and they may be taxed at a rate as low as seven and one-half
percent. Interview with Collange, supranote 115 (Collange managed a plant in an
SEZ located in Tianjin).
202.
Shiu, supra note 2, at 174-75.

203.

See supranote 201.

204.
Machinery, spare parts, raw materials, vehicles, and other means of
production for the enterprise are exempted from import duties. Shiu, supra note
2, at 175.
205.
The funds must be reinvested for a minimum of five years. Id. at 176.
206.
Id.
207.
Id. at 175. This benefit, of course, is subject to any restrictions the
PRC government decides to impose.
208.
Interview with Collange, supranote 115.
209.
Interview with Grow, supranote 96.
210.
Shiu, supranote 2, at 176.

540

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:503

2 11
the firm may recruit its own laborers.
enterprise,
Furthermore, through pre-agreed labor contracts, employers in
SEZs have the benefit of knowing with certainty the cost of labor
before establishing a plant in the zone. In China, as in the United
States, labor contracts set the terms of employment, 2 12 but the
cost of labor is so low that the 13
result is not a labor monopsony,
2
which inflates the cost of labor.

2.

The Importance of the Special Economic Zones to Hong Kong

The Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen, China, which is
located across the border from Hong Kong, has enjoyed rapid
growth since its establishment in 1980.214 Indeed, Hong Kong
investment accounts for eighty percent of total foreign investment
in Shenzhen,2 15
and provides another example of the
interdependence between Hong Kong and mainland China. The
success of Shenzhen resembles the commercial success of Hong
2 16
Kong under the British Empire.
Shenzhen's success as an SEZ has two distinct implications
for Hong Kong. First, the trade ties between China and Hong
Kong have become so strong that it is not possible to alter the
economy of one without significantly altering the other's
economy. 2 17 A shock to Hong Kong's economy will affect the
Shenzhen economy; likewise, a shock to the Shenzhen economy
will affect the Hong Kong economy.
This interrelationship
enhances the likelihood of the future prosperity of Hong Kong
because China would potentially undermine its own economic
interests if it were to take any actions that harmed Hong Kong's
economic health. Second, the case study of the SEZs offers an
example of a small scale capitalist economy existing within
China's socialist structure. Thus, the success of SEZs such as
Shenzhen implies that the economic health of Hong Kong will be
preserved after 1997, even in a "one country, two systems"
scheme.
Additionally, some commentators argue that the mere
existence of Special Economic Zones within the People's Republic

211. Id.
212. The terms of employment include the scales and forms of wages, award
methods, labor insurance, and various state subsidies. Id.
213. A monopsony is the functional equivalent of a monopoly of the labor
force, where one organization controls the availability of all laborers.
214. HARDING, supranote 199, at 165.
215. Shiu, supra note 2, at 177.
216. HARDING, supra note 199, at 165.
217. See Shiu, supranote 2, at 178-79.
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suggests the likelihood of future prosperity in Hong Kong.2 18 By
allowing fledgling outposts of capitalism to exist within mainland
China, the People's Republic has demonstrated its potential
willingness to foster capitalism in the China of the future, not just
in Hong Kong. Any actions by the Chinese government that
would dismantle the SEZ system and the growing pockets of
capitalism would hinder China's longer-term goals of promoting
2 19
prosperity within both Hong Kong and China.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The transfer of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China

could be looked upon with a great deal of optimism. Most of the
literature that predicts economic hardship for Hong Kong after
1997 focuses on the level of investor confidence immediately
following the announcement of the Joint Declaration. However, in
today's volatile economic climate, many of the assumptions
initially made about China and Hong Kong may no longer be
valid.
Since that time, Hong Kong has seen an influx of
investment from the industrialized world and from mainland
China.
Furthermore, many commentators approach the question of
Hong Kong's future prosperity as a question of whether Hong
Kong will be better off or worse off after the transfer of control.
The question may more properly be viewed as whether Hong Kong
will be able to maintain its existing economic structure. The
pressure on China for Hong Kong to succeed and prosper has
increased and, therefore, China will likely allow Hong Kong to
continue to maintain its current system. The ultimate question
regarding Hong Kong thus becomes: Will Hong Kong prosper in
the twenty-first century?
The greatest potential for economic growth in the world exists
in the People's Republic of China.
The availability of raw
materials, other resources, and low-cost labor has caused
southeast Asia and China to become the world's chief
manufacturing region for subcomponents, and the potential for
manufacturing success within mainland China has barely been
tapped. More important to those entrepreneurs and investors
who are looking ten and twenty years ahead is the fact that China
potentially possesses the largest consumer market in the world.
One-fifth of the world's population resides in the People's

218.
219.

See id. at 180.
Id.
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Republic, and as China becomes more and more developed,
merchants all over the world will want to expand into China. The
best way to accomplish this goal will most likely be entry into the
Chinese market via Hong Kong.
It has often been said that after 1997, as goes China, so too
will go Hong Kong. It is equally accurate to say that as goes Hong
Kong, so too will go China. The two economies are inextricably
linked and for them to sever their ties without seriously damaging
both economies would be virtually impossible. This fact alone
seems to be enough to ensure that China will take great pains to
ensure that the provisions of the Joint Declaration will be
honored so that Hong Kong is given every chance to prosper.
When this view is coupled with the notion that the possibility for
China's reunification with Taiwan rests in the success of China's
administration of Hong Kong, the conclusion seems to be
inescapable that the capitalist system of Hong Kong will continue
past 1997 virtually unchanged. In the end, the forecast for the
next century would seem to call for continued prosperity in Hong
Kong. However, the "glory days" of economic and financial
activity that Hong Kong experienced in the late 1980s are in the
past, and Hong Kong will not likely achieve such a status in the
world economy.
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